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Abstract
The article addresses the controversial question to what extent 
EU Member States are bound by EU fundamental rights finally 
codified with the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. Here, a potentially 
broad approach of the ECJ (e.g. Fransson-case) stands in 
opposition to a rather restrictive position of national constitutional 
courts. The debate is understandable, considering the potential for 
unitarization residing within central catalogues of fundamental 
rights, in particular if interpreted in an activist jurisprudence; 
moreover, the Member States ’ fundamental rights and the 
(national) constitutional courts entrusted with their protection 
might be marginalized. Hence, the answer to the question 
determines whether the EU will embark on a route towards more 
unitarization or rather towards more federalisation. The article 
covers both the material delimitation of the spheres of 
fundamental rights as well as institutional and procedural 
implications (future role for ECJ and national constitutional 
courts).  
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I.  INTRODUCTION
“As long as”, “as far as”, “thus far and no further”: from the perspective of 
the Federal Constitutional Court in Germany, these three key phrases rep-
resent significant landmarks and lines of conflict in the development of a 
EU fundamental rights protection. While the so-called Solange-Vorbehalt 
(Provisional Reservation) first formulated in 1974 was intended to secure 
an adequate protection of fundamental rights with respect to an action of 
the European Union,1） the perspective has taken a 180-degree turn since 
the end of the 1980s. Of central importance is no longer the Solange-juris-
prudence’s question of the extent to which an indispensable national fun-
damental rights standard restricts the applicability of EU law at the na-
tional level; what is particularly acute now, rather, is the question of the 
extent to which EU fundamental rights finally codified with the Treaty of 
Lisbon of 2009 also bind the Member States.2） Here, a rather broad ap-
proach of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) stands in opposition to a 
rather restrictive position of the German Federal Constitutional Court. It 
has been established in Karlsruhe’s settled case-law that national funda-
mental rights do not apply to national measures as far as they implement 
mandatory requirements of EU law; insofar, the EU’s fundamental rights 
come into effect;3） however, the expansive tendencies evident especially in 
the Fransson-judgment of the ECJ of 26 February 20134） were countered 
by the Federal Constitutional Court just two months later in its judgment 
regarding the anti-terror database of 24 April 2013 with a “thus far and no 
further”. Karlsruhe not only considered an expansive applicability of EU 
 1） German Federal Constitutional Court, BVerfGE (reports) 73, 339 (376).
 2）  On this, see F. Wollenschläger, in: Hatje/Müller-Graff (ed.), Enzyklopädie Europarecht, vol. 
1, 2014, § 8 para. 10 ff.
 3） Federal Constitutional Court, BVerfGE (reports) 118, 79 (95 ff.).
 4）  ECJ, Case C-617/10 (Fransson), EU:C:2013:105, para. 17 ff. Cf., however, II. 2. for a more 
restrictive approach of the ECJ in recent judgments.
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and its Applicability to the Member States（WOLLENSCHLÄGER）2015】 3
fundamental rights to the Member States an ultra vires act, but also es-
tablished a new barrier to European integration assigned to the inviolable 
identity of the German constitutional order (Art. 79 Paragraph 3 GG) – 
namely, that a substantial scope for national fundamental rights protec-
tion has to be preserved.5）
Given the issues at stake here, this is understandable.6） For, experi-
ence in federal systems (for example, in the German federal state or in the 
USA) demonstrates that a considerable potential for unitarization resides 
within central catalogues of fundamental rights – also in areas for which 
there are no, or only weak, competences at the federal level; this is accom-
panied by a marginalization of the Member States’ fundamental rights 
and of the (state) constitutional courts entrusted with their protection. 
This is problematical, and especially so with regard to functioning and dif-
ferentiated systems of protection such as the protection of fundamental 
rights in Germany. On the other hand, though, federal experience also 
demonstrates that legal unity and precedence of federal law require uni-
form standards of fundamental rights.
It is against this background that this article raises the question of 
the scope of application of EU fundamental rights to the Member States. 
It shall focus primarily on the material delimitation of the spheres of fun-
damental rights (II.). Moreover, the institutional and procedural dimen-
sion  will be considered (III.).
II.   DELIMITATION OF NATIONAL AND EU FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
WITH REGARD TO MEMBER STATE ACTION
According to the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice established since 
the end of the 1980s, Member States are bound by EU fundamental rights 
if national authorities act “within the scope of application of EU law”.7） Ar-
 5） Federal Constitutional Court, BVerfGE (reports) 133, 277 (316).
 6）  On this and the following, see Eeckhout, CML Rev. 39 (2002), 945 (945); Groussot/Pech/
Petursson, in: de Vries/Bernitz/Weatherill (ed.), The Protection of Fundamental Rights in 
the EU after Lisbon, 2013, 97 (100 f.); P. M. Huber, EuR 2008, 190 (190, 198 f.); idem, NJW 
2011, 2385 (2385 f.); F. Kirchhof, NJW 2011, 3681 (3681 f.); Mayer, EuR Supplement 
1/2009, 87 (93); Wollenschläger (N. 2), § 8 para. 16, 29 ff.
 7）  ECJ, Joined Cases 60/84 and 61/84 (Cinéthèque), ECR 1985, 2605, para. 26 (“area”); Case 
C-260/89 (ERT), ECR 1991, I-2925, para. 42; Case C-368/95 (Familiapress), ECR 1997, 
I-3689, para. 24; Case C-276/01 (Steffensen), ECR 2003, I-3735, para. 70.
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ticle 51 Paragraph 1 Sentence 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(CFR) is somewhat more reserved in its formulation and orders an obliga-
tion of Member States to respect EU fundamental rights “only when they 
are implementing Union law”. Three cases may be distinguished.8） First, 
the implementation and enforcement of EU law, notably of EU directives 
and EU regulations. Second, action by Member States in a context some-
how determined by EU law, a category still lacking in profile and to which 
the aforementioned Fransson-case belongs. Third, Member State action in 
the context of restricting the EU fundamental freedoms, a category which 
has been fiercely called into question just after the Charter came into 
force, but which will not be discussed in more detail here. Just a short 
comment: in my view, the dimension of EU fundamental rights in this con-
stellation is exaggerated, since there is no doubt that EU law determines 
autonomously the admissibility and extent of limitations to the fundamen-
tal freedoms.9）
1.   Implementation and enforcement of EU secondary law
An obligation to apply EU fundamental rights exists under Article 51 Par-
agraph 1 Sentence 1 CFR when Member States implement EU law, includ-
ing especially the enforcement of an EU regulation or the implementation 
of an EU directive. What is disputed, however, is the extent of the obliga-
tion. Do Member States only have an obligation to respect EU fundamen-
tal rights when they implement obligatory requirements of EU law or also 
when they are granted discretionary power? Both cases also raise the 
question of the parallel applicability of national fundamental rights be-
sides EU fundamental rights.10）
When implementing mandatory requirements of Union law, the Mem-
ber States are not only bound by EU fundamental rights; rather, securing 
precedence and uniform application of EU law precludes the parallel ap-
plication of national fundamental rights, although national implementa-
tion acts do exist. This has been recognized by the Federal Constitutional 
 8）  See Wollenschläger (N. 2), § 8 para.16 ff.
 9）  Cf. the so-called ERT-jurisprudence [Case C-260/89 (ERT), ECR 1991, I-2925, para. 42 ff.]; 
also confirmed after the CFR has entered into force in ECJ, Case C-390/12 (Pfleger), 
EU:C:2014:281, para. 30 ff. Cf. for a detailed discussion Wollenschläger (N. 2), § 8 para. 25 
ff.; idem, EuZW 2014, 577.
 10）  Cf. for more details and with further references Wollenschläger (N. 2), § 8 para. 18 ff.
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Court, and convincingly so.11） Let us take the example of the EU directive 
2006/24/EU on data retention (which in the meantime has been held void 
because of infringing EU fundamental rights12）). Here, national legislation 
implements the obligation of telecommunications providers to retain con-
nection data stipulated by EU secondary law. If we were to examine these 
national implementation acts in the light of national fundamental rights, 
the retention of data made obligatory by EU law would depend on the re-
sult of national scrutiny of fundamental rights in the respective Member 
State. This conflicts with the precedence and uniform application of EU 
law and is – in any case, as long as there is an adequate standard of protec-
tion at EU level – not imperative in the interest of protecting fundamental 
rights. Besides, in absence of an own leeway, Member States function as an 
extended arm of the EU, so that, from a material point of view, there can be 
no question of their exercising national sovereign power.13）
The situation is different in cases where EU law grants Member 
States discretion with regard to implementation – in our example Member 
States may determine how long telecommunications providers have to re-
tain data on telecommunications connections in a period of between six 
and 24 months. Nevertheless, the ECJ assumes an obligation of Member 
States to EU fundamental rights also in the case of discretion. For this 
discretion has been granted by EU law.14） The Federal Constitutional 
Court opposed this in its judgment on the anti-terror database and argued 
for an application of national fundamental rights.15）
 11）  Federal Constitutional Court, BVerfGE (reports) 118, 79 (95 ff.).
 12）  ECJ, Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 (Digital Rights Ireland Ltd et al.), 
EU:C:2014:238.
 13）  Cf. ECJ, Case C-206/13 (Siragusa), EU:C:2014:126, para. 32; von Danwitz, EuGRZ 2013, 
253 (259); Dederer, ZaöRV 66 (2006), 575 (584); Jacobs, EL Rev. 26 (2001), 331 (333 f.); 
Weiler/Fries, in: Alston (ed.), The EU and Human Rights, 1999, 147 (161 f.).
 14）  Cf. ECJ, Case C-540/03 (Parliament/Council), ECR 2006, I-5769, para. 104 f.; further 
Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 (N.S. et al.), ECR 2011, I-13905, para. 64 ff.; von Bog-
dandy/Kottmann/Antpöhler/Dickschen/Hentrei/Smrkolj, ZaöRV 72 (2012), 45 (55); von 
Danwitz, in: Essays in honour of Herzog, 2009, 19 (27 ff.); Epiney, ZAR 2007, 61 (63 f.); 
Griebel, Der Staat 52 (2013), 371 (388); Ladenburger, in: Laffranque (ed.), The Protection of 
Fundamental Rights Post-Lisbon, FIDE, vol. 1, 2012, 141 (165); Trstenjak/Beysen, EL Rev. 
38 (2013), 293 (304 ff.); Ward, in: Peers/Hervey/Kenner/Ward, The Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, 2014, para. 51.119.
 15）  Cf. Federal Constitutional Court, BVerfGE (reports) 133, 277 (316); on this Thym, NVwZ 
2013, 889 (894 f.).
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At first sight, there are good reasons for this restrictive position.16） 
True, an obligation of the Member States to EU fundamental rights also 
when enjoying discretion is still covered by the wording of Article 51 Para-
graph 1 Sentence 1 CFR referring to “implementing”. However, by adding 
the word “only” and containing reservations regarding Member States’ 
competences [cf. only Art. 51 Paragraph 2 CFR; cf. further Art. 6 Para-
graph 1/2 Treaty on European Union (TEU)], EU law expresses a rather 
restrictive tendency. Moreover, the unitarization effect resulting from an 
obligation to EU fundamental rights questions the granting of discretion 
to the Member States. Finally, if EU law opens up various options to the 
Member States, choosing one of these options does not endanger the uni-
form application of EU law.
However convincing this delimitation of the spheres of fundamental 
rights may seem at first sight, we must not overlook its problems and limi-
tations.17） For, differentiating between obligatory requirements of a direc-
tive and those that grant discretion may artificially split up a uniform set 
of circumstances and its regulatory context, which can give rise not only to 
legal difficulties, but also to deficits in terms of protection, since protection 
of fundamental rights is then parcelled out. Even more important, howev-
er, is the following objection, which significantly reduces the persuasive-
ness of the separation solution: not every leeway is a leeway. For, require-
ments of EU law might reduce the scope of discretion seemingly granted 
according to the wording of a directive. For, directives – in view of their be-
ing acts of the Union legislator – have to be interpreted in line with re-
quirements of EU fundamental rights. So, in our example, the question 
would arise as to whether the retention period of between six and 24 
months provided for in the directive is consistent with EU fundamental 
rights. Were we to conclude that, in view of the intense limitation of funda-
mental rights, only a retention of a maximum of six months is permitted, 
there would be no leeway at the national level at all. Hence, as a prelimi-
nary question for applying national fundamental rights to national acts 
 16）  See AG Gulmann, Case C-2/92 (Bostock), ECR 1993, I-972, para. 33 f.; Calliess, JZ 2009, 
113 (120); Kingreen, EuR 2013, 446 (453); Lindner, EuR 2007, 160 (191 f.); Masing, NJW 
2006, 264 (267).
 17）  Cf. Calliess, JZ 2009, 113 (121); von Danwitz, in: Essays in honour of Herzog, 2009, 19 (23, 
27 f.); De Cecco, CML Rev. 43 (2006), 9 (11); Di Fabio, in: Löwer (ed.), Bonner Gespräche 
zum Energierecht, vol. 1, 2006, 9 (10 f., 15); Lindner, EuZW 2007, 71 (72); Thym, NVwZ 
2013, 889 (892).
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exercising discretion granted by EU law, the question always arises as to 
whether and to what extent this leeway is limited by EU law. A strict sep-
aration of spheres of fundamental rights is therefore not possible in view 
of the layered process of law-making.18）
Against this background, we have to consider the applicability of na-
tional fundamental rights to acts of Member States that make use of dis-
cretionary powers. As the ECJ has emphasized several times recently, na-
tional fundamental rights may be applied, but only “provided that ... 
neither the level of protection of the Charter ... nor the priority, the unity 
and the effectiveness of EU law is affected”.19） The Federal Constitutional 
Court applies national fundamental rights, but sometimes assumes (and 
without referral to the ECJ) a very broad scope of discretion with regard 
to implementation.20）
2.   Member States’ acting in a context determined by EU law
The question of whether Member States implement EU law and are there-
fore bound by EU fundamental rights does not only arise with regard to 
obligations clearly defined by EU law, such as the previously discussed re-
quirement in an EU directive that data from telecommunications connec-
tions be retained for a certain period of time. This takes us to the second 
part of this chapter – namely to the diffuse group of cases in which Mem-
ber States act in a context somehow determined by EU law. The discussion 
of this issue is only at the very beginning.21）
One prominent example is the Fransson-case, which has already been 
mentioned several times. This case concerns the applicability of the EU 
fundamental right of “ne bis in idem” (Article 50 CFR) with regard to na-
tional (Swedish) tax and criminal proceedings that run in parallel and 
that were based on infringements of the obligation to declare Value Added 
Tax. The fact that neither the national criminal procedural law nor the tax 
sanctions law implement specific norms of EU secondary law has been de-
clared irrelevant by the Court of Justice. According to the Court, what is 
 18）  Cf. on the interaction, ECJ, Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 (Digital Rights Ireland 
Ltd et al.), EU:C:2014:238, para. 60 ff.; further Ohler, NVwZ 2013, 1433 (1437).
 19）  Cf. ECJ, Case C-399/11 (Melloni), EU:C:2013:107, para. 60; further Case C-617/10 (Frans-
son), EU:C:2013:105, para. 29; Wollenschläger (N. 2), § 8 para. 24 with further references.
 20）  See Federal Constitutional Court, BVerfGE (reports) 125, 260 (308 f.); E 129, 78 (104 f.); 
E 130, 151 (186 ff.). Cf. for a critical view Griebel, Der Staat 52 (2013), 371 (386 ff., 395).
 21）  For more details, see Wollenschläger (N. 2), § 8 para. 29 ff. with further references.
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sufficient, rather, is that the levying of VAT and the sanctioning of viola-
tions of the obligation to declare taxes is determined by EU law. To estab-
lish such a determination, the ECJ has referred to the principle of loyalty, 
the obligation to declare taxes provided for by EU secondary law and the 
obligation of EU primary law “to impose effective penalties for conduct 
prejudicial to the financial interests of the European Union” (Article 325 
TFEU).22） Yet, are these links to EU law sufficient for activating EU fun-
damental rights? One might even go further and join Advocate General 
Sharpston in applying EU fundamental rights in all areas of shared com-
petences irrespective of their having been exercised by passing EU legisla-
tion, which would result in a far-reaching obligation of the Member States 
to apply EU fundamental rights.23）
Generally speaking, the ECJ still has no clear line here. Besides far-
reaching judgments such as the Fransson-case just mentioned, there are 
also restrictive approaches – for example, the repudiation of an obligation 
to fundamental rights where EU competences have not been exercised 
(Bartsch case)24） or where there is only an indirect link to EU policy areas 
(Annibaldi case)25）.26） In its judgment on the anti-terror database, the Fed-
eral Constitutional Court has emphasized that an indirect link to EU law 
is not sufficient to apply EU fundamental rights.27）
Where can we draw the line, then? For the reasons explained in the 
context of an obligation to fundamental rights when Member States enjoy 
discretion, a restrictive reading seems appropriate.28） Only sufficiently spe-
cific requirements of EU (primary and secondary) law trigger the applica-
bility of EU fundamental rights.29） This requires a careful analysis of the 
 22）  ECJ, Case C-617/10 (Fransson), EU:C:2013:105, para. 17 ff.
 23）  AG Sharpston, Case C-34/09 (Ruiz Zambrano), ECR 2011, I-1177, para. 163 ff.
 24）  ECJ, Case C-427/06 (Bartsch), ECR 2008, I-7245, para. 18.
 25）  ECJ, Case C-309/96 (Annibaldi), ECR 1997, I-7493, para. 13 ff.
 26）  Cf. further ECJ, Case C-457/09 (Chartry), ECR 2011, I-819, para. 23 ff. (intermediate pro-
ceedings); Case C-466/11 (Gennaro Currà and Others), EU:C:2012:465, para. 25 (compen-
sation in the context of Second World War); Case C-369/12 (Corpul Na㶥ional al Poli㶥i㶆tilor), 
EU:C:2012:725, para. 15 (salary reductions in the public sector); Case C-370/12 (Pringle), 
EU:C:2012:756, para. 179 f. (ESM-Treaty); Case C-128/12 (Sindicato dos Bancários), 
EU:C:2013:149, para. 11 ff. (salary reductions in the public sector); Case C-73/13 (T.), 
EU:C:2013:299, para. 11 ff. (attorneys’ fees). Cf. further von Danwitz, EuGRZ 2013, 253 
(260); Iglesias Sánchez, CML Rev. 49 (2012), 1565 (1588 ff.).
 27）  Federal Constitutional Court, BVerfGE (reports) 133, 277 (316).
 28）  See F. Kirchhof, NJW 2011, 3681 (3684 ff.); Ladenburger (N. 14), 141 (163 f.).
 29）  von Danwitz, in: Essays in honour of Herzog, 2009, 19 (28).
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EU legislation in question. In view of the variety of possible constellations, 
a great deal of work of concretization in the jurisdictional and academic 
fields still needs to be carried out to operationalize this delimitation.30） In 
any case, competences that have not yet been exercised certainly do not 
suffice.31）
The ECJ has also recently adopted a more restrictive approach – 
namely, in its judgment in the Siragusa-case of 6 March 2014, the subject 
of which was the question of the applicability of EU fundamental rights to 
an order issued by an authority of one of the Member States to remove 
buildings that had been erected in breach of landscape protection law.32） 
No specific rules of EU law applied to this situation; the referring Italian 
court, however, saw a link to EU environmental policy. The latter, however, 
was not sufficient for the Court of Justice. Although it reaffirmed its inter-
pretation developed in the Fransson-case of Article 51 Paragraph 1 Sen-
tence 1 CFR, according to which EU fundamental rights apply to any na-
tional measure falling within the scope of application of EU law,33） the 
ECJ, though drawing on previously developed principles, also stressed the 
limits of the obligation of the Member States to respect EU fundamental 
rights: thus, “the concept of ‘implementing Union law’, as referred to in Ar-
ticle 51 of the Charter, requires a certain degree of connection above and 
beyond the matters covered being closely related or one of those matters 
having an indirect impact on the other”.34） The important point is whether 
the national legislation in question “is intended to implement a provision 
of EU law; the nature of that legislation and whether it pursues objectives 
other than those covered by EU law, even if it is capable of indirectly af-
fecting EU law; and also whether there are specific rules of EU law on the 
matter or capable of affecting it”.35） In any case, EU law needs to impose 
on Member States an obligation “with regard to the situation at issue in 
the main proceedings”.36） Finally, the critical point is whether the non-ap-
 30）  For a test, cf. Ward, in: Peers/Hervey/Kenner/Ward, The Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
2014, para. 51.118.
 31）  Cf. Ohler, NVwZ 2013, 1433 (1434); Thym, NVwZ 2013, 889 (894).
 32）  ECJ, Case C-206/13 (Siragusa), EU:C:2014:126.
 33）  ECJ, Case C-206/13 (Siragusa), EU:C:2014:126, para. 21 f.
 34）  Ibid., para. 24.
 35）  Ibid., para. 25.
 36）  Ibid., para. 26. See also Ladenburger (N. 14), 141 (167 N. 104); Lenaerts/Gutiérrez-Fons, in: 
Peers/Hervey/Kenner/Ward, The Charter of Fundamental Rights, 2014, para. 55.12 ff.
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plication of EU fundamental rights would “undermine the unity, primacy 
and effectiveness of EU law”.37） The recent judgment in the Hernández-
case of 10 July 2014 follows the same lines.38）
III.  PROCEDURAL IMPLICATIONS
Let me conclude by taking a brief look at the procedural implications. In-
sofar as obligatory requirements of EU law are implemented and therefore 
national fundamental rights do not apply, there is no jurisdiction of the 
Federal Constitutional Court whose competence is limited to applying na-
tional constitutional law. Matters are different where discretionary powers 
of Member States are concerned. Due to the parallel applicability of EU 
and national fundamental rights, the Federal Constitutional Court retains 
jurisdiction in view of the latter. Even so, the question will often arise as to 
how far the leeway of Member States is limited by EU law, which takes 
precedence; this presumes a reference to the ECJ, a path which the Feder-
al Constitutional Court has not followed so far in the area of fundamental 
rights.39） This presents challenges to legal protection in two respects: First 
the obligation to refer a case to the ECJ does not only take time, but may 
also overburden the latter in view of the great number of cases involving 
such issues of EU law. Second, individuals may challenge EU legislation 
before the ECJ only under very limited conditions [cf. Art. 263 Paragraph 
4 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)].
As a last procedural implication, let me point to the strengthening of 
ordinary courts in relation to the Federal Constitutional Court, since the 
former (unlike the Federal Constitutional Court) are competent to apply 
EU fundamental rights and thus set aside national legislation in breach of 
them.40）
 37）  ECJ, Case C-206/13 (Siragusa), EU:C:2014:126, para. 31 f.
 38）  ECJ, Case C-198/13 (Hernández), EU:C:2014:2055, para. 32 ff. A restrictive approach has 
also been followed in the most sensitive Dano-case concerning the access of economically 
inactive Union citizens to social assistance handed down on 14 November 2014, cf. ECJ, 
Case C-333/13 (Dano), EU:C:2014:2358, para. 85 ff. On this F. Wollenschläger, NVwZ 
2014,1628.
 39）  In 2014, for the first time, the Federal Constitutional Court referred a case to the ECJ 
(OMT Decision of the ECB as an ultra vires act), NJW 2014, 907.
 40）  Cf. Thym, NVwZ 2013, 889 (895); further Kingreen, JZ 2013, 801 (808 f.).
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IV.  CONCLUSION
The principles of precedence and of uniform application of EU law require 
applying EU fundamental rights to national law determined by EU law. 
This extends not only to constellations in which EU secondary law explic-
itly obliges the Member States to act in a certain way. Rather, even in cas-
es where Member States enjoy discretion, the question arises as to the ex-
tent to which EU fundamental rights limit the scope of discretion 
awarded. In this (limited) sense, the Fransson-judgment of the ECJ has 
been right in stressing: “Since the fundamental rights guaranteed by the 
Charter must therefore be complied with where national legislation falls 
within the scope of European Union law, situations cannot exist which are 
covered in that way by European Union law without those fundamental 
rights being applicable. The applicability of European Union law entails 
applicability of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter.”41） Or: 
“Metaphorically speaking, this means that the Charter is the ‘shadow’ of 
EU law”.42）
The latter reflects the reason (not always sufficiently well considered) 
for the fact that Member States are increasingly bound by EU fundamen-
tal rights. This development results from a growing allocation of compe-
tences to the European Union and the exercise of them, notwithstanding 
expansive approaches in the ECJ’s jurisprudence and in the literature (e. 
g. a safety net for fundamental rights).43） To me, it seems important to give 
this some thought – against the background, for example, of the current 
debate about the general regulation on data protection.
 41） ECJ, Case C-617/10 (Fransson), EU:C:2013:105, para. 21.
 42）  Lenaerts/Gutiérrez-Fons, in: Peers/Hervey/Kenner/Ward, The Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, 2014, para. 55.26.
 43） von Bogdandy/Kottmann/Antpöhler/Dickschen/Hentrei/Smrkolj, ZaöRV 72 (2012), 45.

